Resistance to Mass Atrocities in Southeast Asia
In Southeast Asia, civilians have mobilized to resist past and present atrocities. Resistance to atrocities in Southeast Asia has manifested in the form of disobedience, survival, flight, insurgence, and civil society mobilization, among others.
President Rodrigo R. Duterte shows a copy of a diagram showing the connection of high level drug syndicates operating in the country during a press conference at Malacañang on July 7, 2016. King Rodriguez/Presidential Photographers Division
On 14 October 2022 the Mass Atrocity Resistance project held a workshop that focused on the Southeast Asia region. The featured speakers were Dr Annie Pohlman (University of Queensland), Dr Jess Melvin (University of Sydney), Dr Diah Kusumaningrum (Universitas Gadjah Mada), Ayu Diasti Rahmawati (University of Florida) and Dr Sol Iglesias (University of the Philippines). This post offers a summary of the presentations, highlighting certain overarching themes.
Diah Kusumaningrum and Ayu Diasti Rahmawati’s presentation, Disguised Disobedience: Civilians' Resistance Against Mass Killings in Indonesia, focused on the societal dynamics during the Indonesian politicide (1965–1966) and the Aceh civil war (1976–2005). It revealed that the risk of mass atrocities and the options to resist them are closely linked to victims’ group membership (either actual or perceived). Resistance strategies include actions meant to avoid being associated with a particular side of the conflict or being forced to take part in hostilities. For instance, individuals could seek religious affiliation to avoid being labelled as ‘religionless’ during Indonesia’s anti-communist purge, or schools could allow students to progress academically to prevent them from being recruited by combatants. Since they are not explicit manifestations of resistance, this type of action is classified as ‘disguised disobedience’, which in a mass atrocity setting implies preserving or restoring victims’ personhood and their social and political bonds.
Annie Pohlman and Jess Melvin’s presentation, Comparing Civilian Resistance to Mass Violence during the 1965–1966 Genocide and Separatist War (1976–2005) in Aceh, Indonesia reflected on resistance movements that emerged in Aceh during the 1960s and 1990s, identifying, through victims’ testimonies, the conditions that made them possible. They showed that during 1965-66, the military crackdown in Aceh was so swift and catastrophic that it made resistance almost impossible. As a consequence, a large exodus of Chinese nationals managed to flee Indonesia thanks to their well-organized efforts and network. A wider variety of forms of resistance during the 1990s nationwide reform movement, following the resignation of authoritarian president Suharto in 1998, indicate that the possibility and effectiveness of opposition largely depend on timing. Civil society movements became better organized and more effective, with various cases of resistance proliferating in the Aceh region particularly. More contentious forms of resistance also emerged in Aceh during this time, as members of the transmigrant Javanese community faced the difficult choice of whether or not to leave Aceh, or whether to join local government-sponsored militias instead.
Sol Iglesias’ presentation, The ‘War on Drugs’ in the Philippines: Finding Democratic Resistance to Mass Violence, presented a case of resistance to state-led violence outside conventional conflict. The Philippine ‘war on drugs’ (2016-2022) provides important lessons on how resistance can emerge at the institutional (‘horizontal’) level. During his presidency, Duterte implemented a nationwide anti-crime campaign that relied on the ruthless use of force and resulted in the deaths of 12,000 to 30,000 Filipinos. Data reveal higher levels of violence in the months immediately after his election (a ‘shock tactics’ period) and lower levels by the end of his term (a ‘normalization’ period). A pivotal moment for the transition to a ‘normalization period’ was associated with the extrajudicial murder of Kian de los Santos, which fuelled a series of protests and widespread societal opposition to the ‘war on drugs.’ Domestic and international accountability mechanisms (in particular, the International Criminal Court) also had a significant statistical impact in reducing violence and preventing its re-escalation to the initial levels of intensity.
Resistance in South-East Asia: Conclusions
There is a need for better articulating what may constitute resistance. Resistance to atrocities can manifest in the form of disobedience, survival, flight, insurgence, and civil society mobilization, among others.
In contrast with more open demonstrations of resistance, disguised disobedience can entail, for instance, concealing one’s identity in order to avert persecution or gain access to arms and equipment for self-defence.
When studying atrocity scenarios, there is a tendency to assume that escalation and intensification imply fewer resistance options. However, by looking comparatively at resistance precedents at the local level, a more dynamic reality becomes evident.
Resistance options are largely dependent on timing. Even within the same region and under similar patterns of violence, the possibility and manner of resisting atrocities can differ significantly.
Considering mass atrocities as side effects of conflict is a common misconception. As the abuses committed during The Philippines’ ‘war on drugs’ demonstrate, atrocities can also occur under circumstances of relative peace.
In non-conflict settings, international judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms can play important roles in enabling local resistance efforts.