Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Responsibility to Protect
The fulfilment of states’ promise to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity – embedded in the political doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – calls for a better understanding of the multifaceted influence of religious or non-religious beliefs on the perpetration and prevention of mass atrocities. This blog entry explores the different manifestations of religion and belief systems in mass atrocity dynamics and their link to states’ commitments under R2P, and illustrates the relevance of R2P and atrocity prevention to the freedom of religion and belief (FoRB) agenda.
Christians pray to a shrine of Mother Mary during a midnight prayer service at the Our Lady Of Charity Church on April 11, 2009 in the village of Raikia, 350kms south of Bhubaneswar, India. Christians gathered to pray fearing the threat of continuing secular violence in the Kandhamal province. (Photo by Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images.)
FoRB and atrocity prevention. Main points:
In recent years, FoRB has become an important mobilising factor in international affairs and foreign policy, as evidenced by the proliferation of inter-religious dialogues and the building of international coalitions for the advancement of FoRB globally. However, states very rarely associate their work on FoRB with atrocity prevention explicitly.
The causes and dynamics of mass atrocity situations are often characterised by the presence of religious elements. In some circumstances, religion or beliefs may be instrumentalized for inducing sectarian violence and hatred. In others, they can be drivers of resilience or help mitigate the risks of atrocity crimes.
The effective realisation of the right to FoRB necessarily implies protecting religion- or beliefs-based groups from atrocity crimes. This requires a close monitoring of risk situations and willingness to take steps to prevent their escalation. Understanding the role that faith or belief may play in the escalation or de-escalation of abuses provides states with more opportunities to take preventive action.
International efforts to promote FoRB, should operate through an atrocity prevention lens. An atrocity prevention perspective can be applied without resorting to R2P terminology in circumstances where the use of such language would be unhelpful.
FoRB-related early warning indicators of potential atrocities usually include state-led discriminative rhetoric and legislation, criminal prosecution for religious offenses, censorship, and destruction of worship sites.
Attacks against religion or beliefs may be but one aspect of a wider crisis. Religion and belief systems can be intertwined with other identity markers, such as ethnicity, which makes the need for nuance and tailored responses pressing. Risk assessment and early warning indicators must be assessed in light of the specific contextual circumstances.
The responsibility to protect: An overview
R2P is a global political commitment to prevent the worst forms of violence and human rights abuses, unanimously affirmed by all member states at the United Nations’ (UN) 2005 World Summit and enshrined in paragraphs 138 and 139 of its Outcome Document. R2P emerged as a response to the international community’s failure to halt the atrocities committed in the Balkans and Rwanda during the 1990s, and builds on states’ pre-existing international humanitarian and human rights obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The UN Secretary-General (UNSG) has issued yearly reports on R2P since 2009, the first of which laid out a three-pillar strategy for its implementation.[1]
Pillar One: Places on each state the primary responsibility to protect its population from atrocity crimes.
Pillar Two: Asserts that the international community must assist and encourage individual states to fulfil their responsibility to protect when they are unwilling or unable to do so.
Pillar Three: Provides that, should a state fail to meet its obligations, the international community may respond in a ‘timely and decisive’ manner by using the range of peaceful and non-peaceful means available under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter.
Members of the Yazidi community from the area and from various European countries visit the holy temple of Lalish during a holiday in Duhok, Iraq on July 22, 2022. (Photo by Adri Salido/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Although not legally binding per se, the R2P doctrine provides useful guidance on the scope of states’ political commitments to protect civilian populations. The three pillars are not meant to be followed sequentially, and the suitability of a particular approach should be weighed against the specific circumstances of each case. Likewise, the three-pillar strategy emphasises the value of prevention and subsidiarity, explicitly placing the R2P within the boundaries of the UN security framework and aligning it with the prohibition of the use of force.
Atrocity crimes and freedom of religion or belief – legal classifications
In conflict situations and minority/majority power dynamics, state and non-state actors can frequently be found to instrumentalise religion or belief systems to justify violent behaviour against opposing groups or to rally support for their cause. Discrimination, hostility, and social and economic exclusion are commonplace in such scenarios, since violence leading to mass atrocities often feeds on political marginalisation and sectarianism.
The nature of atrocities committed under the auspices of religion or against a religious group can thus be manifold, and three distinct classifications may become relevant under international law: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Such categories are collectively referred to as ‘atrocity crimes’[2] in the practice of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and are legally defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
When committed against religious or belief-based groups, atrocities would generally fall under the meaning of ‘persecution’, defined as the ‘intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’.[3] Although persecution is included in the broader category of crimes against humanity, it could amount to genocide under the Rome Statute if the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected (in this case, religious) group is demonstrated.[4] Similarly, individual responsibility for war crimes can be established if violations against members of a religious group or religious personnel take place in the context of an (international or non-international) armed conflict, regardless of whether the victims are combatant or non-combatant.
R2P, as articulated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, expanded the concept of ‘atrocity crimes’ to include ethnic cleansing. While not recognised as an independent crime under international law, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is considered to include coercive practices meant to render an area ethnically homogeneous by removing members of ethnic or religious groups.[5] Such acts may themselves amount to one of the recognised atrocity crimes if the conditions described above are present.
Freedom of religion or belief as a risk assessment and early warning indicator
FoRB, as enshrined in Articles 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recognises every individual’s right to practise their religion or belief in public or in private. It also implies that everyone should be free to convert from one faith to another without compulsion, as well as not to adhere to any religion or set of beliefs. Given FoRB’s intrinsic relation to other human rights (e.g., the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly), its systematic curtailment significantly increases the risk of atrocity crimes.
Since the occurrence of mass atrocities is impossible to predict precisely, effective prevention requires a reliable assessment of the particular circumstances of each case. For that purpose, researchers and institutions have developed systems of risk assessment (RA) and early warning (EW) that allow predicting the likelihood of mass atrocities with varying degrees of certainty.
As described in a previous entry to this blog, RA indicators refer to state-level and structural features that cannot easily be altered, and that are present in a high number of countries. In relation to FoRB, they encompass circumstances that enable the persecution of groups on the basis of their faith (or lack thereof) by placing them in a particularly vulnerable situation. For their part, EW indicators include more dynamic factors, that may trigger atrocities in high-risk societies. They are instances of human rights abuses that evidence the escalation of assessed risks, and serve to gain a better understanding of the potential for mass atrocities.[6]
In addition to risk factors such as instability and a past record of abuses, RA and EW assessments frequently emphasise the dangers that ideology may pose when used to advance exclusionary and nationalist policies in the name of religious or non-religious beliefs.[7] Similarly, in risk scenarios, restrictions on FoRB and the increased targeting of religious or non-religious actors are common early symptoms of atrocities to come. EW indicators concerning FoRB usually include state-led discriminative rhetoric and legislation, criminal prosecution for religious offenses, censorship, and destruction of religious sites.[8]
However, in addressing EW and assessed risks, one should be careful not to generalise or draw broad assumptions about the role that FoRB plays in the prevention or escalation of abuses.[9] As the Rohingya situation in Myanmar has shown, attacks against religion or beliefs may be only one aspect of a wider crisis.[10] Religion and belief systems can also be intertwined with other identity markers, such as ethnicity and race, which makes the need for nuance and tailored responses more pressing.[11] RA and EW indicators are, thus, an essential tool for informing preventive work and responses to atrocities, but their forecasts must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances to which they relate.
Preventing mass atrocities: the role of religion and belief systems
As part of their commitment under the Outcome Document, states pledged to support the UN in establishing the ‘early warning capability’ necessary for the effective assessment of potential atrocity crimes.[12] Efforts in this area are led by the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (the Office), which coordinates the work of the Special Advisers on the Responsibility to Protect and on the Prevention of Genocide.[13] The Office collects information, conducts assessments, provides training and technical assistance, and raises awareness ‘of the causes and dynamics of atrocity crimes and of the measures that could be taken to prevent them’.[14]
From the violent campaigns by the so-called Islamic State against religious minorities in Iraq and Syria to the ongoing abuses committed by the Chinese government against the Uyghur people, the causes and dynamics of some of the most recent atrocities the world has witnessed have been characterised by the presence of religious elements. Recognising these realities, the Office has prioritised two thematic areas in its work to develop adequate responses to the assessed risks: 1) preventing incitement to violence through engagement with religious leaders and actors, and 2) addressing and countering hate speech.[15]
The words of religious leaders and actors can exert great influence on the behaviour of their congregations or of those that share the same beliefs as them. When properly oriented, they can directly contribute to peace and reconciliation. However, a distorted exercise of this responsibility may manifest itself in the form of hate speech, which implies using language to attack or discriminate against individuals and communities based on their identity (religious or otherwise). Hate speech that is used to incite violence, hostility and discrimination is referred to as ‘incitement’ and can constitute an EW indicator of imminent atrocities. Under international law, only hate speech that reaches the threshold of incitement is prohibited, but it can have harmful effects on persons even if it does not.
The Office’s efforts in these areas led to the development and adoption of the Fez Plan of Action (2017), which sets out recommendations for religious leaders and relevant actors for preventing incitement to violence against individuals and communities by reason of their faith or other identity markers.[16] Along a similar vein, to counter the negative consequences of all forms of hate speech and to prevent its escalation into atrocity crimes, the UN has developed a Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (2019) in line with international human rights standards.[17] Both documents acknowledge that, while states are primarily responsible for preventing atrocity crimes under R2P, their success relies to a great extent on the multilayer efforts of a broader range of actors.
Freedom of religion or belief and ‘timely and decisive’ action
The reality of millions of people continuously exposed to atrocity crimes around the world is a painful reminder of how, time and again, the international community has fallen short of its promise to never again allow the horrors of the Holocaust to occur. Atrocity prevention and the effective operationalisation of R2P face constant setbacks for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the lack of political will to translate early warning into action.[18] States have been, for the most part, reluctant to hold each other accountable under R2P standards or to refer to its language explicitly in their international relations and policies. Such hesitancy is mainly rooted in the widely-spread misconception that the main concern of R2P is the use of force, which has significantly affected states’ willingness to fulfil their pledges under the Outcome Document.[19]
Nevertheless, in addition to its relevance for understanding the dynamics that precede mass atrocities, FoRB has also become an important factor for political mobilisation at the international level. Indeed, the prevalent and widely documented issue of religious persecution has generated a series of positive reactions by governments in recent years, ranging from express acknowledgement to the building of international coalitions for the advancement of FoRB globally. The creation of the International Religious Freedom Alliance in February 2020 is the materialisation of this trend at the inter-state level, and currently represents the most coordinated international effort to combat discrimination and persecution based on religion or belief’ around the world.[20]
Within the UN system, inter-religious dialogues and events have proliferated during the past two decades, as engagement with faith-based actors continues to grow at all levels of the organisation.[21] The link between FoRB and security has also been amply discussed at the UNSC, with several members calling for a more systematic integration of the protection of members of religious or belief groups into its work.[22] Similarly, given its unique role as an inter-governmental forum for dialogue on human rights issues, the Human Rights Council has become a suitable setting for enabling discussions on FoRB, and concerns have repeatedly been raised over the situation of persecuted religious minorities in member states.
If the right conditions are in place, this shared international concern for upholding FoRB may provide the necessary political cohesion for reinforcing the operationalisation of R2P. However, any improvement would necessarily require states to operate through an ‘atrocity prevention lens’[23] in their FoRB-related work, given that the effective realisation of FoRB is inextricably connected to the protection of religious or beliefs-based groups from atrocity crimes. Applying an atrocity prevention perspective to their existing policies, programmes, and strategies, means that states should identify factors that may lead to atrocity crimes, evaluate the atrocity risks, and recognise that mass atrocity situations may require other responses than, for instance, humanitarian disaster or military conflict.
Nevertheless, a realistic understanding of the world implies recognising that, in some instances, explicitly referencing R2P may bear counterproductive consequences or compromise states’ perceived neutrality. While states should be mindful of these considerations in their international relations, an atrocity prevention lens may be implemented consistently even if R2P language is not openly used. In practice, states may choose to conduct efforts aimed at upholding R2P without resorting to its terminology, although express acknowledgement is naturally a preferred approach for the proper consolidation of the doctrine.
Good Practices for the Way Forward
Utilise the FoRB framework to increase early warning capability
Action against atrocities is often taken after violence has reached a certain threshold, if taken at all. Attacks and restrictions on FoRB are consistent indicators of the potential for mass atrocities, and documenting instances of abuse is therefore essential for developing a strong EW system. Considering their proximity to affected groups, states’ diplomatic and consular missions can play a key role in raising awareness of the situation of religious or belief groups in the host country, as well as in collecting data that allow the international community to assess risks and deter the occurrence of atrocities. Such EW awareness-raising requires the active application of an atrocity prevention perspective on conflicts and human rights abuses.
Prioritise atrocity prevention in foreign policy
Given that religious minorities often are victims of mass atrocities, the full exercise of FoRB necessarily requires the protection of religious or belief-based groups from atrocities and should therefore not be treated separately. While the protection of religious minorities is included among several states’ foreign policy priorities, atrocity prevention policies are rarely stated in such clear terms. Addressing situations from the atrocity prevention perspective helps identify the specific vulnerabilities of religious groups and the nature of the abuses to which they are subjected, and informs the adoption of tailored responses to avoid gross violations of their rights. Importantly, an atrocity prevention perspective can be applied without resorting to explicit R2P terminology in situations where the use of such language is unhelpful.
Establish R2P Focal Points and Enhance Collaboration among Them
An R2P Focal Point is a senior government official tasked with steering national responses to mass atrocities and advocating for their prevention internationally.[24] R2P Focal Points commonly fulfil their mandates through close cooperation with the Global Network, whose membership includes more than 60 officials representing every region of the world. It is therefore recommended that every state designates an R2P Focal Point and joins the Global Network, which is widely regarded as a sign of their commitment to mass atrocity prevention. Similarly, R2P Focal Points can help mainstream the issue of religious persecution at international fora, facilitate diplomacy, and build coalitions of like-minded states in order to prevent the perpetration of atrocities.
Useful resources
UN Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/publications-and-resources.shtml
UN Special Rapporteur on FoRB: https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-religion-or-belief
Early Warning Project: https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org
Global Action Against Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC) – Resource Library: https://www.gaamac.org/resources/list
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect: http://www.globalr2p.org/
Pew Research Center – International Religious Freedom & Restrictions: https://www.pewresearch.org/topic/religion/religious-freedom-restrictions/international-religious-freedom-restrictions/
Global Network of R2P Focal Points: https://www.globalr2p.org/the-global-network-of-r2p-focal-points/
[1] United Nations General Assembly, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General’ (12 January 2009). UN Doc A/63/677, para 11.
[2] UNSG, ‘Responsibility to Protect: From Early Warning to Early Action’ (1 June 2018). UN Doc A/72/884-S/2018/525, Summary, fn 1.
[3] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art 7.2(g).
[4] Ewelina Ochab, Never Again: Legal Responses to a Broken Promise in the Middle East (Kairos Publications 2016) 650–655.
[5] UNSC, ‘Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)’ (26 January 1993). UN Doc S/25274
[6] Ellen Stensrud, ‘Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems’ (2021). Mass Atrocity Responses, <https://www.massatrocityresponses.com/blog/risk-assessment-and-early-warning-systems> accessed 12 May 2022.
[7] Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2016) 57–58.
[8] HRC, ‘Rights of Persons Belonging to Religious or Belief Minorities in Situations of Conflict or Insecurity’ Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (2 March 2022) UN Doc A/HRC/49/44, paras 1–2.
[9] A/HRC/49/44, para 3.
[10] Ellen Stensrud, ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) and the Rohingya’ (2021) Mass Atrocity Responses, <https://www.massatrocityresponses.com/blog/will-forb-help-the-rohingya> accessed 12 May 2022.
[11] A/HRC/49/44, para 2.
[12] UNGA, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/Res/60/1, paras 138–140; See also A/64/864, paras 1–4.
[13] Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention’ (2014), 4.
[14] Ibid, 4–5.
[15] UNGA, ‘Advancing Atrocity Prevention: Work of the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General’ (3 May 2021). UN Doc A/75/863-S/2021/424, para 39.
[16] UN Doc A/75/863-S/2021/424, paras 40–43; Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes’ (2017) 2.
[17] UNSG, ‘United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech’ (2019).
[18] UNGA, ‘Mobilizing Collective Action: the Next Decade of the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General’ (22 July 2016). UN Doc A/70/999-S/2016/620, para 28.
[19] UNSC, ‘A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (13 July 2015) UN Doc A/69/981–S/2015/500
[20] U.S. Department of State, ‘Declaration of Principles for the International Religious Freedom Alliance’ (5 February 2020), <https://www.state.gov/declaration-of-principles-for-the-international-religious-freedom-alliance/>, accessed 12 May 2022.
[21] Ibrahim Salama and Michael Wiener, Reconciling Religion and Human Rights: Faith in Multilateralism (Edwar Elgar 2022) 62.
[22] UNSC, ‘Arria-formula Meeting: Advancing the Safety and Security of Persons belonging to Religious Minorities in Armed Conflict’ (22 August 2019), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2019/08/arria-formula-meeting-advancing-the-safety-and-security-of-persons-belonging-to-religious-minorities-in-armed-conflict.php>, accessed 12 May 2022; UNSC, ‘Arria-Formula Meeting - Religion, Belief and Conflict: Advancing the Protection of Members of Religious and Belief Groups in Conflict and the Role of Religious Actors in Conflict Resolution’ (19 March 2021), <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1e/k1ezlwusof> accessed 12 May 2022.
[23] Alex J Bellamy, ‘Operationalizing the “Atrocity Prevention Lens”: Making Prevention a Living Reality’ in Sheri P Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (eds), Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention (Cambridge University Press 2015).
[24] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Manual for R2P Focal Points’, <http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Updated-Annexes-R2P-Focal-Points-Manual.pdf>, accessed 24 May 2022, 23–24.