The Role of Religious Leaders in Mass Atrocity Prevention
Although atrocity prevention is the primary responsibility of states, it relies on the multilayer efforts of a wide range of actors to be effective. Given that there are religious underpinnings to most contemporary atrocity situations, religious leaders are particularly well situated to influence the behaviour of those who share their faith. While the role of non-state actors in crisis scenarios has gained considerable attention internationally, the specific contributions of religious leaders to atrocity prevention have been predominantly studied in the closely-related field of peacebuilding. Therefore, this post will shed light on some of these knowledge gaps, seeking to better inform international responses to atrocities.
Buddhist monks hold placards featuring images of Aung San Suu Kyi during a protest on February 13, 2021 in Yangon, Myanmar. Photo by Hkun Lat/Getty Images
Religious leaders and atrocity prevention. Main points:
Many contemporary atrocity situations are characterised by the presence of religious elements and the involvement of a wide range of actors.
The influence of religious leaders over susceptible coreligionists can be a catalyst of atrocities, as their words and actions may intensify perceived antagonisms.
Even though religious leaders may often act as perpetrators or instigators of atrocity crimes, they can also be central to a society’s ability to resist and recover from atrocities.
The role of non-state actors in crisis situations has gained considerable attention internationally, but the specific contributions of religious leaders to atrocity prevention have been predominantly studied in the closely-related field of peacebuilding. Failure to differentiate between both fields risks undermining the extent to which the needs of victims and vulnerable populations may be effectively addressed.
Peacebuilding encompasses all measures aimed at preventing the occurrence, escalation, and repetition of armed conflict. On the other hand, the field of atrocity prevention analyses the risks and triggers of mass atrocities (including but not limited to conflict), as well as the actions needed to avert or respond to them.
While states are primarily responsible for protecting their populations from mass atrocities, the effective fulfilment of such duty relies on the multilayer efforts of a wide range of actors. Engaging with religious leaders is essential to further states’ understanding of atrocity dynamics and to inform the adoption of tailored responses to assessed risks.
Buddhist monk Wirathu; founder of the widely criticized anti-Muslim movement Campaign 969. Photo by Jonas Gratzer/LightRocket via Getty Images
Religious elements in atrocity situations. Overview:
Religion concerns the most fundamental realities of an individual’s subjective well-being, as it provides a set of core values that guide their conduct and interpretation of life. It is also a source of social cohesion, since its expression (through worship or otherwise) is frequently found to shape peoples’ ethnic and cultural identities. Thus, the right to hold religious beliefs and manifest them accordingly is widely recognised as an essential prerogative, closely intertwined with other human rights such as freedom of expression, of assembly, and of association. Not surprisingly, the extent to which the right to freedom of religion or belief is effectively protected may be indicative of the health of a society, as its curtailment is commonly followed by a decline of a state’s human rights situation. In that sense, within the field of atrocity prevention, the averse treatment of religious communities is considered an early warning sign of mass atrocities to come.
In atrocity situations, perpetrators may utilise fundamentalist notions of religion to legitimise their political claims and to justify the repression of dissidents or opponents. The destruction of places of worship, segregation along ethno-religious lines, and exclusion from political life are commonplace in such settings and may escalate into mass violence. Contemporary patterns of religious-motivated violence in Nigeria[1] and Myanmar[2], as well as the abuses perpetrated by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) against all non-Sunni Muslim groups in areas under its control,[3] serve to evidence such dynamics and the clear correlation between religious intolerance and the occurrence of atrocities. Proper attention should thus be paid to the religious underpinnings of crisis situations and to the impact that the instrumentalization of religion may have in the escalation of violence. A failure to acknowledge such interconnectedness may limit the effectivity of attempts to prevent atrocities or to adequately address the needs of victims. As will be explored in the subsequent sections of this post, engaging with religious leaders and other non-state religious actors is essential to further states’ understanding of atrocity dynamics and to inform the adoption of tailored responses to assessed risks.
The role of religious leaders as instigators and perpetrators
In recent decades, the world has witnessed an abundance of atrocities attributable to non-state actors, evidenced particularly by a proliferation of religiously motivated attacks by groups such as ISIL and Boko Haram.[4] A frequent characteristic in such scenarios is the dissemination of hate speech in public discourse and media, often used to antagonize or discriminate against specific communities by reason of their identity. The spread of hate speech is widely regarded as a precursor to atrocities, as it may also be employed to incite violence and hostilities that can rapidly reach such threshold.
In that sense, in addition to their potential role as perpetrators, religious leaders may act as instigators in atrocity situations, although the distinction between the two can be more difficult to perceive in theocratic systems.[5] Considering that religious elements are intertwined with most contemporary conflicts, the words of religious leaders may have a profound influence on the behaviour of perpetrators. In India, for instance, religious leaders have used anti-Muslim rhetoric to fuel Hindu nationalist sentiments by explicitly calling for the eradication of Islam.[6] The rapid spread of hate speech, as well as the Indian government’s hesitancy to take action, have significantly increased the risk of India becoming the scenario for atrocities similar to those committed against the Rohingya in Myanmar. More recently, problematic claims made by the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in May 2022 have been condemned for ‘inciting religious hatred’ and justifying the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[7] If allowed to spread unrestrained, such language may offer new grounds on which the perpetuation of the conflict and the atrocities committed therein may be rationalised.
Religious leaders as reconcilers and resilience-builders
There are also roles that religious leaders may play on the other side of the spectrum, namely as reconcilers and resilience-builders. Indeed, while regularly accused of inciting hatred among susceptible coreligionists, religious leaders often do the opposite. As noted by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, ‘religious leaders can make a particular contribution to preventing and responding to atrocity crimes, given their influence over large portions of the population and capacity to rapidly mobilize human and financial resources.’[8]
A paradigmatic example of the dual potential of religion in atrocity situations comes from the precedent of the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s, where religious leaders played a central role in the healing process of Rwanda after the atrocities that, many would argue, they helped lay the foundations for in the first place.[9] A less paradoxical example may be identified in the context of Mexico’s Cristero War in the 1920s, during which religious leaders played a central role rallying resistance against state-sponsored persecution, building resilience among survivors, and facilitating peaceful dialogue between the government and the Catholic hierarchy.[10]
These precedents serve to illustrate the multitude of ways in which influence from religious leaders may positively affect the contexts in which atrocities unfold, and that persecuted groups and vulnerable populations may exercise their own agency in pursuit of self-protection. Resisting mass atrocities may adopt different forms, including symbolic acts of non-compliance and subtle defiance in the face of oppression.[11] Nonetheless, given that most well-known instances of self-defence have involved engaging in armed conflict, the idea of empowering related efforts has become a source of controversy within the international community. [12]
As a consequence, the role that vulnerable groups may play in preventing or protecting themselves from atrocities has often been overlooked in scholarship, prioritising the study of measures adopted at the national level or of (subsidiary) international responses.[13] Similarly, the specific contributions of religious leaders have predominantly been studied in the closely related field of peacebuilding, as they have played key roles in some of the world's most successful peace and reconciliation efforts.[14]
Atrocity prevention and peacebuilding: Ensuring protection beyond conflict scenarios
Mass atrocities and armed conflict frequently arise from similar circumstances, as it is often the case that widespread instability, fear, and antagonism compromise both peace and the rights of vulnerable populations.[15] Such overlap has led to the common assumption that the existence of conflict is a necessary condition for the occurrence of large-scale human rights abuses and, therefore, that atrocity prevention is an extension of peacebuilding. However, given that atrocities also occur outside armed conflict, effective prevention necessarily requires approaches beyond peacebuilding and a deeper understanding of the differences between the two fields.
Peacebuilding, on the one hand, encompasses all measures aimed at preventing ‘the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict.’ [16] The field of atrocity prevention, on the other, analyses the factors that may lead to the occurrence of large-scale human rights abuses and the actions needed to avert or respond to them. Such atrocities are often one-sided and committed by state or state-like agents. Depending on their nature, such abuses may fall within the meaning of four separate ‘atrocity crimes’: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Under the international political doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), states have vowed to act in a timely and decisive manner to prevent the occurrence of such crimes.[17] Thus, the field of atrocity prevention has broad implications that touch on issues of international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law,[18] and failing to differentiate it from peacebuilding risks undermining the extent to which the needs of vulnerable populations may be effectively addressed.[19]
The practice of distinguishing between the two fields has mostly spread in academic circles and, to a lesser extent, among policymakers. Concerning religious leaders in particular, their specific contributions to the prevention of atrocities are seldom documented as such and tend to blend within the scope of their peace work. As a result, atrocity prevention initiatives by religious leaders have commonly been studied through the lens of peacebuilding. At the UN, the distinction between atrocity prevention and peacebuilding is more explicit and increasingly embraced at all levels.
Similarly, the particular role that religious leaders may play in atrocity dynamics has been recognised in its own right. The Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect (the Office) has been particularly influential in that regard, as it has prioritised engagement with religious leaders in its efforts to promote adequate responses to risks of atrocities.[20] The Office’s work also led to the adoption of the Fez Plan of Action (2017), which sets out recommendations for religious leaders for preventing incitement to violence against individuals and communities by reason of their faith or identity.[21]
Such a focus seems to respond to a growing trend to engage with religious actors in all sectors related to the work of the UN, evidenced by ‘the frequency of inter-religious dialogues and events around the themes of interfaith harmony, tolerance, fraternity and living together.’[22] Nonetheless, both religion and R2P continue to have unfortunate connotations in the collective mind-set of the international community and states tend to be overly cautious when approaching them both in their multilateral relations.
Recommendations
Engage with religious leaders and faith-based actors under an atrocity prevention perspective
It is recommended that states integrate an atrocity prevention perspective to their foreign policy and multilateral efforts, prioritising engagement with religious leaders and faith-based actors. This implies establishing partnerships, coordinating training and educational programmes, and fostering dialogue with atrocity prevention as an overarching theme. In doing so, the Fez Plan of Action and the UN’s Faith4Rights Toolkit should serve as key points of departure for meaningful engagement.
Help mainstream the interconnectedness between atrocity prevention and freedom of religion or belief at the international level
While the prevention of atrocities relies to a great extent on the multilayer efforts of a wide range of actors, states are primarily responsible for protecting their populations from atrocity crimes. The discharge of such duty implies bringing the particular vulnerabilities of religious minorities to the fore and actively seeking to promote the prevention of atrocities (religiously motivated or otherwise) as a matter of international concern. In that regard, given its unique role as an inter-governmental forum for dialogue on human rights issues, the Human Rights Council offers a forum for mainstreaming atrocity prevention internationally. Similarly, the International Religious Freedom Alliance currently represents the most coordinated effort at the inter-state level to combat discrimination and persecution based on religion or belief,[23] making it a suitable setting for states to come together and agree on co-ordinated action to promote freedom of religion or belief worldwide.
It is thus recommended that states continue to make use of these fora and support efforts aimed at addressing the root causes of mass atrocities. Given that R2P is commonly associated with the use of force and that religion tends to be linked to religious-based conflict, states may exercise discretion in their approach to both in the context of international affairs. They may, as appropriate, choose to mainstream atrocity prevention without resorting to explicit R2P language.
Establish an R2P Focal Point
R2P Focal Points are senior government officials that guide national responses to mass atrocities and advocate for their prevention internationally.[24] R2P focal points are essential for implementing atrocity prevention at the national level, as they may help review and evaluate existing policies, enable intra-governmental discussions, advise political leadership, and offer related education to government agencies.[25] The work of R2P Focal Points may also inform multilateral diplomacy and help build international coalitions to advance atrocity prevention, given that Focal Points commonly fulfil their mandates through cooperation with a Global Network of 60 officials representing every region of the world. It is therefore recommended that every state designates an R2P Focal Point and joins the Global Network, which is widely regarded as a sign of commitment to mass atrocity prevention.
References
[1] Human Rights Council, ‘Violations and Abuses Committed by Boko Haram and the Impact on Human Rights in the Countries Affected’ (9 December 2015) Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UN Doc A/HRC/30/67 paras 1-2, 7-8; Center for Preventive Action, ‘Conflict with Boko Haram in Nigeria’ (12 May 2022) <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria> accessed 28 July 2022; UK All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief, ‘Nigeria: Unfolding Genocide?’ (2020) 11-13; ‘Slutt å oversjå det religiøst hat’ (2022) 52(4) Magasinet Stefanus 18-19.
[2] See United Nations Refugee Agency, ‘Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained’ (13 July 2022) <https://www.state.gov/remarks-for-the-2nd-annual-international-religious-freedom-summit/> accessed 28 July 2022; UN, ‘UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar calls on UN Member States to Remain Vigilant in the Face of the Continued Threat of Genocide’ (23 October 2019) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/10/un-independent-international-fact-finding-mission-myanmar-calls-un-member?LangID=E&NewsID=25197> accessed 28 July 2022.
[3] Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Iraq in the Light of Abuses Committed by the So-Called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Associated Groups’ (27 March 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/18 paras 5, 16-28; European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 4 February 2016 on the Systematic Mass Murder of Religious Minorities by the So-Called “ISIS/Daesh” (2016/2529(RSP))’ (31 January 2018) Official Journal of the European Union (2018/C 035/16 Philip Mounstephen, ‘Bishop of Truro’s Independent Review for the Foreign Secretary of FCO Support for Persecuted Christians: Final Report and Recommendations’ (2019).
[4] Cyanne E Loyle, ‘Understanding Nonstate Actor Behavior: The Determinants of Mass Atrocities’ (2018) 9 Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide Series of Occasional Papers 1; Uğur Ümit Üngör 'Non-State Actors and Atrocity Crimes' in Barbora Holá, Hollie Nyseth Nzitatira, and Maartje Weerdesteijn (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Atrocity Crimes (Oxford University Press 2022) 373 385.
[5] Ibrahim Salama and Michael Wiener, Reconciling Religion and Human Rights (Edward Elgar Publishing 2022) 61.
[6] Indian American Muslim Council, ‘Congressional Briefing on Hindu Extremists’ Call for Genocide of Muslims’ (12 January 2022) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hrfocteUApk> accessed 28 July 2022.
[7] Religious Information Service of Ukraine, ‘UOC-MP statement can be seen as incitement to religious hatred, - SSUEFC’ (13 May 2022) <https://risu.ua/en/uoc-mp-statement-can-be-seen-as-incitement-to-religious-hatred---ssuefc_n129243> accessed 28 July 2022.
[8] UN News, ‘On Margins of UN Assembly, Religious Leaders Discuss Strategies for Preventing Atrocity Crimes’ (21 September 2016) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/09/539672-margins-un-assembly-religious-leaders-discuss-strategies-preventing-atrocity> accessed 28 July 2022.
[9] Jean d'Amour Banyanga and Kaj Björkqvist, ‘The Dual Role of Religion Regarding the Rwandan 1994 Genocide: Both Instigator and Healer’ (2017) 3 Pyrex Journal of African Studies and Development 1-12.
[10] Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (México), ‘Fin de la Guerra Cristera (1926-1929)’ <https://www.cndh.org.mx/noticia/fin-de-la-guerra-cristera-1926-1929#:~:text=Los%20cristeros%20fueron%20aquellos%20mexicanos,Pol%C3%ADtica%20de%20los%20Estados%20Unidos> accessed 28 July 2022.
[11] Rachel Killean, ‘Religion, Resistance, and Responding to Genocide: The Cham in Cambodia’ in Sara E Brown and Stephen D Smith (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Religion, Mass Atrocity, and Genocide (Routledge 2021) 227.
[12] Deborah Mayersen, ‘Rethinking Approaches to Prevention under the Responsibility to Protect: Agency and Empowerment within Vulnerable Populations’ in Stephen McLoughlin (ed), Mass Atrocities, Risk and Resilience
Rethinking Prevention (Brill | Nijhoff, 2015) 136.
[13] ibid 126
[14] David Smock (ed), ‘Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War’ (2006) 55 Peaceworks.
[15] Ellen Stensrud, ‘Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems’ (2021) Mass Atrocity Responses <https://www.massatrocityresponses.com/blog/risk-assessment-and-early-warning-systems> accessed 28 July 2022.
[16] UNGA, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/Res/60/1.
[17] United Nations General Assembly, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General’ (12 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677.
[18] Peace Direct, ‘Atrocity Prevention and Peacebuilding: Key Insights and Lessons from a Global Consultation Convened by Peace Direct’ (2018) 7.
[19] Orly Maya Stern and Clare Brown, ‘Mainstreaming Atrocity Prevention: Seeing Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Programming through an Atrocity Prevention Lens’ (Oxford institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict 2022) 6-8.
[20] UNGA, ‘Advancing Atrocity Prevention: Work of the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General’ (3 May 2021) UN Doc A/75/863-S/2021/424 para 39.
[21] ibid paras 40–43; Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes’ (2017) 2.
[22] Salama and Wiener (n 7) 61-62.
[23] U.S. Department of State, ‘Declaration of Principles for the International Religious Freedom Alliance’ (5 February 2020), <https://www.state.gov/declaration-of-principles-for-the-international-religious-freedom-alliance/>, accessed 28 July 2022.
[24] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Manual for R2P Focal Points’, <http://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Updated-Annexes-R2P-Focal-Points-Manual.pdf> accessed 28 July 2022, 23–24.
[25] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘National R2P Focal Points Recommendations’ <https://www.globalr2p.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/recommendations_r2p-focal-points.pdf > accessed 28 July 2022, 3.